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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
DAVID C. STREETER, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 930206-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District 
Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable John A. Rokich presiding. He appeals from the 
judgment and conviction entered on the plea. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1994). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did alleged illegalities prior to defendant's invocation of his Miranda rights in 
his first interview taint defendant's confession in a second interview? 
Standard of review. "In reviewing a trial court's determination on the voluntariness 
of a confession, [the appellate court will] apply a bifurcated standard of review. Under the 
bifurcated standard, the ultimate determination of whether a confession is voluntary is a legal 
question, and [the appellate court will] review the trial court's ruling for correctness. To the 
extent the trial court has made subsidiary factual findings, however, those findings will not 
be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 890, 892 (Utah 
1993) (citations omitted). 
2. In the second interview, was defendant's waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights 
knowing and intelligent, and his confession voluntary? 
Standard of review. See issue No. 1. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
This case does not turn on the language of any constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant and two co-defendants1 were charged by amended information with the 
following crimes: 
Count I Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990); 
Count II Aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990); 
Count HI Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1990); 
Count IV Attempted criminal homicide, murder in the second degree, a second 
degree felony, in violation of 76-5-203 (1990). 
1
 The co-defendants were Dustin Ward and Kevin Harry Neff (R. 11). 
2 
Gang enhancements pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.1 (Supp. 1992) were sought in 
connection with counts III and IV; a firearms enhancement pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-203 (1990) was sought in connection with count IV (R. 11-15, addendum A). 
Defendant filed a motion to suppress his partial confession as violative of the Utah 
Constitution and the United States Constitution as construed in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 
436 (1966) and Edwards v. Arizona. 451 U.S. 477 (1981) (R. 67-68, 71-72). The trial court 
denied this motion after an evidentiary hearing (R. 111-116). 
Pursuant to a plea bargain, defendant pled guilty to aggravated assault, reserving his 
right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress under State v. Serv. 758 P.2d 935 (Utah 
App. 1988) (R. 161-67, 170).2 
On March 1, 1993 defendant was sentenced to the statutory prison term, no fines, and 
restitution as determined by Adult Probation and Parole (R. 175). Defendant timely filed his 
Notice of Appeal (R. 177). 
The court of appeals remanded to the trial court for entry of a finding as to whether 
the issue reserved for appeal was dispositive as then required by State v. Montova. 858 P.2d 
1027 (Utah App. 1993). State v. Streeter. 864 P.2d 910 (Utah App. 1993). The Utah 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in both Montova and Streeter to consider the conditional 
guilty plea issue only. It ruled in Montova that the issue reserved on a conditional guilty 
2
 It is apparent from the plea affidavit and minute entry that the parties were referring to 
the original three-count information (R. 8-10) rather than the amended four-count information 
(R. 11-14) in structuring the plea. Neither the Statement of Defendant (R. 161-67) nor the minute 
entry (R. 170) recognizes the existence of a fourth count. The apparent intent of the parties was 
to dismiss all counts except the one to which defendant pled guilty. 
3 
plea need not be dispositive of the case. State v. Montova. 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 68, 70 
(Utah 1994). Accordingly, the supreme court remanded Streeter "to the court of appeals to 
consider the merits of Streeter's appeal in that court" (Remittitur dated 15 December 1994). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of two vicious gang attacks in the early morning hours of 22 
September 1990. 
THE CHARGED CRIMES3 
First gang attack. According to the probable cause statement,4 a car driven by the 
Mortensen family was forced to the side of the road at approximately 6407 West 4100 South, 
West Valley City. Ten or more young men, including defendant, ran to the car and began 
kicking and beating on it and threatening to kill the four occupants. The driver, Craig 
Mortensen, managed to drive the car away and stopped at a nearby convenience store. As 
his wife Karen called 911, defendant and his co-defendant Neff approached the Mortensen's 
car carrying rocks and again threatening to kill the occupants. At that point, 
Craig Mortenson [sic] grabbed a hammer from a tool box, stepped outside the 
car and stated, "I have the right to defend myself." Streeter and Neff attacked 
Craig Mortenson, beating on his head with a rock and kicking his face and 
head. While Karen Mortenson pulled one of the assailants away form Craig 
Mortenson the other ran at her with a rock. He was prevented from striking 
Karen Mortenson only by the intervention of one of the Mortenson's teen-age 
daughters. 
3
 Because this case arises from a guilty plea rather than a verdict, the State relies on the probable 
cause statement to inform the Court of the charges against defendant. 
4
 Karen Mortensen, a victim, is the source of the information on the first attack. 
4 
Craig Mortenson was rushed by Life Flight to the University Medical Center, where 
emergency surgery for a compound depressed skull fracture saved his life (R. 14). 
Second gang attack. According to the probable cause statement,5 Mark Long and 
Roland Olsen were parked at a convenience store on 7204 West 3500 South, West Valley 
City. An argument arose between Olsen and Long in one truck and Dustin Ward and a 
group of juveniles in another truck. "Suddenly there were twelve or more young men in the 
parking lot," including defendant. A fight developed, and Olsen saw Streeter and his co-
defendants "repeatedly jumping on and kicking Mark Long in the face and head." Long was 
lying on the ground at the time and, after the attack, was unconscious. 
Olsen followed defendant and his co-perpetrators and confronted them about Long's 
condition. 
David Streeter pulled a 22 semi-automatic pistol and threatened to blow 
Olsen's head off. Olsen turned and retreated while others chanted "shoot him, 
shoot him," [and] Dustin Ward was throwing rocks at Olsen. When Olsen 
was approximately twenty feet away from the group he heard the gun fire. A 
projectile landed near his feet. As he turned back around he was struck in the 
face by a tire iron. Then Kevin Neff struck him with a metal pipe. 
Long's life was saved by emergency surgery on his fractured skull (R. 14-15). 
DEFENDANT'S TWO INTERVIEWS 
First interview. Detective Tracy Cowley interviewed defendant on 22 September 
1990 at approximately 8:30 or 9:00 a.m. (R. 189-90). The interview was conducted at the 
station house and was tape-recorded (R. 190). The tape-recording was transcribed and 
appears as pages 1 and 2 of defendant's exhibit 1 (addendum B) (R. 191-92). 
5
 Roland Olsen, a victim, is the source of the information on the second attack. 
5 
Detective Cowley read defendant his Miranda rights, and defendant said he 
understood them (R. 194). The following exchange then ensued:6 
TC: Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now without an 
attorney present? 
DS: No. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1). Detective Cowley later testified that, in his mind, defendant's response 
"required clarification" (R. 195). Accordingly, in "an effort to further understand his 
previous statement" (R. 209), Detective Cowley continued the interview: 
TC: You don't want to talk to us? 
DS: I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing was sleeping over at 
my friends lawn last night and the cops just come ripping in the yard and 
arrested us and 
TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, would you be 
willing to answer those questions without a lawyer present. 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones you 
want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time through. 
TC: Well, I'll tell you right now that if you take that attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who has done what and 
who has done what to who. So I want the truth out of you and I want it now. 
Now do you understand that? 
DS: Yes 
6
 "TC" indicates Detective Tracy Cowley; "DS" indicates defendant David Streeter. 
6 
TC: Who were you with tonight[?] 
DS: J.D. 
TC: Who else? 
DS: Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you have to do is call my mom 
and he will be down here. 
TC: You want your attorney? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you don't want to talk to us? 
DS: Yes 
TC: O.K. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2). Whereupon the interview concluded (R. 211). Detective Cowley did 
not attempt to locate an attorney for defendant (R. 202). Defendant was returned to the 
holding cell (R. 212). 
Defendant's request. An hour to two hours later, Officer Robert Dey "was checking 
on cells again to see if people were, you know, physically all right, if they needed anything" 
(R. 205, 230). He asked defendant only "if he needed anything"; defendant stated "that he 
wanted to talk to the detective again" (R. 205, 213, 230). 
Second interview. The second interview was recorded and transcribed and appears 
on pages 3 through 10 of defendant's exhibit 1 (addendum B). Officer Bruce Sterner was 
also present and asked a single question (R. 206-07). 
Detective Cowley began by confirming that defendant recalled being Mirandized and 
desired to waive his rights: 
7 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights? 
DS: Yes. 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you wanted to talk to a 
lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Now is it your desire [—] and you come forth voluntarily [--] that you want to 
talk to me now? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Go ahead. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B). Thereafter defendant gave a partial and self-serving, but 
nonetheless incriminating, description of his participation in the crimes. He said he threw a 
rock that hit Craig Mortensen and admitted kicking him in the chest; he also admitted 
kicking Mark Long in the head (see Def. Ex. 1 at 5-7, addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendant's dilemma in this case arises out of the fact of the two interviews. All 
the alleged police misconduct occurred in the first interview, but all the incriminating 
statements were made in the second interview, one to two hours later. He therefore must 
rely on "attenuation analysis" to demonstrate that alleged illegalities in the first interview 
"tainted" his confession in the second. Defendant's claim fails because only actual 
compulsion will taint a subsequent confession, and defendant cannot demonstrate actual 
compulsion. 
8 
2. Defendant's waiver of rights was knowing and intelligent, and his confession 
voluntary. After defendant terminated the first interview by invoking his rights, he initiated 
further conversation about the crime with police. Re-recitation of the Miranda warnings was 
unnecessary because defendant remembered the previous warnings and had demonstrated his 




A number of factual assertions in the Brief of Appellant are incorrect, misleading, or 
otherwise require clarification. 
First, footnote 4 on page 6 of Brief of Appellant contains numerous factual assertions 
regarding defendant's age, IQ, and education. The source of these assertions is a 
psychological evaluation attached to a diagnostic evaluation report apparently prepared for 
sentencing purposes. 
Although Utah has no rule, most appellate courts, in reviewing the denial of a pretrial 
motion to suppress evidence, will consider only evidence before the court at the suppression 
hearing. See, e.g., United States v. Hicks. 978 F.2d 722, 724-25 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Baez v. 
State. 425 S.E.2d 885, 890 (Ga. App. 1992); State v. Rvder. 315 N.W.2d 786, 788-89 
aowa 1982); Aiken v. State. 647 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Md. App. 1994), cert, denied, 651 A.2d 
7
 Since ff[n]o attempt has been made to brief state constitutional questions," the State will 
brief and this Court should consider "only the federal constitutional questions and decline to consider 
whether any state rights are implicated." State v. Fulton. 742 P.2d 1208,1211 n.2 (Utah 1987), 
cert, denied, 484 U.S. 1044 (1988). 
9 
854 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v. Powers. 398 A.2d 1013, 1014 (Pa. 1979); 4 Wayne R. 
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.1(c) (1987). 
Some appellate courts will consider both pretrial and trial evidence in reviewing a 
pretrial ruling. However, courts endorsing this rule generally do so in the context of 
affirming the trial court's pretrial ruling. United States v. Muniz. 1 F.3d 1018, 1021-22 
(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 114 S. Ct. 575 (1993); United States v. Martin, 982 F.2d 1236, 
1239-40 n.2 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Basev. 816 F.2d 980, 983 n.l (5th Cir. 1987); 
State v. Young, 576 So.2d 1048, 1054 n.l, 1055 (La. App. 1991); State v. Duncan. 879 
S.W.2d 749, 751 (Mo. App. 1994). Contra State v. Kong. 883 P.2d 686, 688 (Hawaii App. 
1994) (reversal). 
This Court should not consider information unavailable to the district court at the 
suppression hearing for the purpose of reversing the court's ruling on the motion to suppress. 
Second, repeated references to defendant's having "broken down," Br. of Appellant 
at 8, 18 n.13, 29, 33, are without support in the record or legal parlance. The record 
indicates merely that defendant spent an hour to two hours in a cell, during which time an 
officer "may have asked if he needed to go to the rest room or needed a drink of water, 
anything like that" (R. 231). When an officer "asked him if he needed anything," defendant 
said "that he wanted to talk to the detective again" (R. 230-31). 
Utah courts have consistently used the term "broke down" or "break down" to mean 
more than making a simple request after being left alone for one to two hours. For example, 
Mares v. Hill. 118 Utah 484, 493-94, 222 P.2d 811, 815 (Utah 1950), cert, denied, 341 
U.S. 933 (1951), refers to cases where "the prisoner broke down and confessed only after 
10 
days of long relays [sic] of questioning, wherein he was subjected to physical discomforts 
and disregard for the rudimentary need of life with fear and intimidations exerted, all of 
which were calculated to break his resistance." See also State v. Young, 780 P.2d 1233, 
1237 (Utah 1989) (referring to "emotional courtroom outbursts, including instances where the 
defendant wept and a recess was called because it was not clear whether the defendant 'was 
going to break down'"); State v. Hegelman. 717 P.2d 1348, 1349 (Utah 1986) (after an 
officer "grabbed defendant... by the lapels, moved him sideways against a nearby filing 
cabinet, and called him a rapist," defendant "broke down and cried for a minute, composed 
himself, and then confessed to the crimes"); State v. Johns. 615 P.2d 1260, 1262 (Utah 
1980) (victim "appeared emotionally distraught when she first entered the store and broke 
down completely and began to cry when the police arrived"); State v. Pendergrass. 803 P.2d 
1261, 1263 (Utah App. 1990) ("defendant broke down crying"). This case involves none of 
the fear, intimidation, emotional outbursts, fisticuffs, or tears generally associated in this 
state with the term "broke down." 
Third, defendant's repeated assertion that he was held "incommunicado," Br. of 
Appellant at 24 n.15, 29, 33, 34, is misleading. Defendant was kept in a holding cell with a 
"large . . . group of people" (R. 230-31). The period during which defendant claims to have 
been held "incommunicado" was at most two hours, hardly time to process and book the 
large number of people who were sharing his holding cell. 
Fourth, the description of defendant as being "of a tender age," Br. of Appellant at 
26, is misleading. Even assuming that defendant was 18 years old on the date of the attack, 
18 is not "a tender age" as that term is used in Utah. See, e.g., State v. Butterfield. 784 
11 
P.2d 153, 154 (Utah 1989) (14 years); State v. Wilkerson. 612 P.2d 362, 365 (Utah 1980) (6 
years); Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad. 548 P.2d 621, 623 (Utah 1976) (22 months); 
State ex reL Mullen. 29 Utah 2d 376, 377, 510 P.2d 531, 531 (Utah 1973) ("small 
children"); Baldwin v. Nielsen. 110 Utah 172, 178, 170 P.2d 179, 182 (Utah 1946) (Wolfe, 
J., dissenting) (4 years). 
Fifth, defendant claims that the police had "concerns that David Streeter would not 
submit to interrogation after consultation with an attorney." Br. of Appellant at 29. 
Defendant cites no record support for this factual assertion and the record contains none. 
The record does reflect that there was a "large . . . group of people" in the holding cell at 
the time (R. 230-31). The most reasonable inference from this fact is that the officers simply 
chose to continue processing and interviewing these people rather than to drop their business 
and do defendant a favor by calling his mother. 
Sixth, defendant claims to define "the extent to which David Streeter understood his 
rights," and asserts that "David Streeter's knowledge of his rights was limited to his prior 
receipt of Miranda warnings . . . " Br. of Appellant at 30, 32. In fact, the record reflects 
nothing about the extent of defendant's knowledge of his rights. Perhaps, like 20-year-old 
Lance Conway Wood, defendant had "heard them a thousand times." State v. Wood. 868 
P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993). 
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POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE ONLY ACTUAL COMPULSION 
WILL TAINT A SUBSEQUENT CONFESSION, AND DEFENDANT CANNOT 
DEMONSTRATE ACTUAL COMPULSION 
Defendant's dilemma in this case arises out of the fact of the two interviews. All the 
alleged police misconduct occurred in the first interview, but all the incriminating statements 
were made in the second interview, one to two hours later. Defendant's dilemma is 
heightened by two additional facts: (1) he peremptorily ended the first interview by invoking 
his Miranda rights, and (2) the police began the second interview by reminding defendant of 
his Miranda rights and that he had successfully invoked them in the first interview. 
In order to succeed in his claim, defendant must link the two interviews in such a way 
that the alleged illegalities in the first fatally taint the second. 
The United States Supreme Court has rejected the "taint" analysis where the prior 
illegality is merely a Miranda violation. In Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298 (1985), an 18-
year-old suspect was taken into custody and, in response to police questioning and without a 
Miranda warning, voluntarily admitted his involvement in a burglary. One hour later and 
after a proper Miranda warning, the suspect confessed. The Oregon Court of Appeals 
required suppression of the confession on the ground that it was tainted by the coercive 
impact of the unconstitutionally obtained statement, since "'the cat was sufficiently out of the 
bag to exert a coercive impact on [Elstad's] later admissions.'" Id. at 303 (quoting State v. 
Elstad. 658 P.2d 552, 554 (Ore. App. 1983). 
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court stressed that although the Miranda 
exclusionary rule "serves the Fifth Amendment," it "sweeps more broadly than the Fifth 
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Amendment itself" and therefore "may be triggered even in the absence of a Fifth 
Amendment violation." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 306. "The Fifth Amendment prohibits use by 
the prosecution in its case in chief only of compelled testimony." Id. at 306-07. 
The Court held that, so long as an unwarned interrogation "involved no actual 
compulsion," a subsequent, warned confession was not "fruit of the poisonous tree." Id. at 
305, 308. There is thus no need to demonstrate that intervening events break the causal 
connection between the illegal interrogation and the confession "so that the confession is 
'sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.'" Id. at 306 (quoting Taylor v. 
Alabama. 457 U.S. 687, 690 (1982) (in turn quoting Brown v. Illinois. 422 U.S. 590, 602 
(1975))). All that is required is administration of a Miranda warning, which "serves to cure 
the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 311. 
Moreover, "the fact that the police interview was coercive [is] not enough, by itself, 
to render the defendant's confession involuntary. To be involuntary there must be a causal 
relationship between the coercion and the subsequent confession." State v. Mabe. 864 P.2d 
890, 893 (Utah 1993). 
Thus, in order to prevail, defendant must demonstrate both the existence of "actual 
compulsion" in the first interview and a causal link to defendant's confession in the second. 
This he cannot do. 
A. Police ceased interrogation when defendant unequivocally invoked his 
Miranda rights. 
Defendant claims that the police continued to interrogate him after he invoked his 
constitutional right to remain silent and not to be interrogated without an attorney present. 
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Br. of Appellant at 11-17. This is not a claim of actual compulsion, but of violation of the 
prophylactic rules of Miranda and its progeny. Therefore, this argument does not advance 
defendant toward his goal of proving that the second interview was tainted. It is therefore 
irrelevant to this case. However, no Miranda violation occurred in any event. 
Only an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel requires police to cease 
interrogation. The United States Supreme Court has recently held that, in order to invoke 
the right to counsel, a suspect "must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently 
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement 
to be a request for an attorney. If the statement fails to meet the requisite level of clarity, 
Edwards does not require that the officers stop questioning the suspect." Davis v. United 
States, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 2355 (1994) (holding that phrase "Maybe I should talk to a lawyer" 
was not a request for counsel). The Court expressing declined to adopt a rule "requiring 
officers to ask clarifying questions" when a suspect makes an ambiguous or equivocal 
invocation of counsel. Id. at 2356. "If the suspects' statement is not an unambiguous or 
unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him." 
Id. 
It is settled law that "an accused . . ., having expressed his desire to deal with the 
police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until 
counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further 
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona. 451 
U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981) (emphasis added). However, "this prohibition on further 
questioning-like other aspects of Miranda~is not itself required by the Fifth Amendment's 
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prohibition on coerced confessions, but is instead justified only by reference to its 
prophylactic purpose." Davis. 114 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Connecticut v. Barrett. 479 U.S. 
523, 528 (1987)). 
In the case at bar, the district court found that "[t]he police officer conducting the 
first interrogation ceased interrogation when the defendant requested counsel" (R. 114, 
addendum C). Such "subsidiary factual findings" "will not be set aside unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Mabe. 864 P.2d at 892; accord State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 83 (Utah 
1993). Defendant has failed to demonstrate that this finding is clearly erroneous. 
Initial invocation equivocal. Defendant's first invocation of his rights-or, more 
precisely, his refusal to waive them-appears to be equivocal. Detective Cowley asked, 
"Having these rights in mind do you wish to speak with us now without an attorney 
present?" Defendant answered, "No" (Def. Ex. 1 at 1, addendum B).8 Detective Cowley 
considered this response to be equivocal. He testified as follows at the suppression hearing: 
Q. [By defense counsel] That answer was unequivocal, wasn't it? 
A. That's right. 
Q. It required no clarification, did it? 
A. Well, in my mind it did. 
(R. 195, emphasis added). 
8
 Although defendant describes his "no" as "emphatic," Br. of Appellant at 12, the record 
does not support this characterization. It does not reflect defendant's "appearance and demeanor, 
his manner of expression and tone of voice, . . . or his tendency to hesitate . . . " Child v. Child. 
8 Utah 2d 261, 267, 332 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1958). 
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Defendant apparently assumes that the clarity of a response must be judged entirely 
by the response itself. Br. of Appellant at 13 ("No means no."). However, sometimes the 
ambiguity of a response may be traced to the question. Thus, "questions with negatives and 
double negative clauses" State v. McMillan. 588 P.2d 162, 164 (Utah 1978), may cause 
confusion even where their answers are categorical. In this case, Detective Cowley's 
question included the word without. While technically not negative, without is "virtually 
negative" and so may occasion "negative confusion." H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of 
Modern English Usage 716 (Sir Ernest Gowers, ed., Oxford University Press 1965). 
Detective Cowley's assertion that "I wanted to clarify and that's why I asked him the 
next question" (id.) is borne out in the transcript. He followed with a series of questions in 
an obvious attempt to evoke an unequivocal response from an evasive suspect: 
TC: You don't want to talk to us? 
DS: I don't know why I am really even in here. All I was doing was sleeping over at 
my friends lawn last night and the cops just come ripping in the yard and 
arrested us and 
TC: Well we have a bunch of questions we would like to ask you, would vou be 
willing to answer those questions without a lawyer presentf?! 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask vou questions and vou will answer the ones vou 
want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2).9 After this waiver, Officer Cowley began the interrogation. Defendant 
9
 That Detective Cowley is sensitive to the potential ambiguity in ayes or no answer is apparent 
(continued...) 
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said nothing incriminating. He then asserted his rights unequivocally and the interview 
promptly concluded (see Def. Ex. 1 at 2; R. 211). 
Initial invocation unequivocal. Even if defendant's initial refusal to waive his rights 
had been unequivocal, his rights were still respected because Detective Cowley immediately 
ceased interrogation. 
Strictly speaking, Miranda does not require that all communication or even 
questioning cease upon the suspect's assertion of his rights, only that interrogation cease. 
Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (holding that officer's comment that it would be 
too bad if a little girl killed herself with the murderer's discarded shotgun was not 
interrogation under Miranda): Miranda. 384 U.S. at 473-74 ("If the individual indicates in 
any manner . . . that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease."); id. at 479 
("unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated . . ., no evidence obtained as 
a result of interrogation can be used against him"). 
Interrogation "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions 
on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 
police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect." Innis. 446 U.S. at 301. 
United States v. DougalL 919 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 501 U.S. 1234 
(1991), illustrates this distinction. After being Mirandized, Dougall requested an attorney. 
9(... continued) 
from his own examination in the suppression hearing (see R. 196-97). He prefers the clearer 
"That's correct" or "that's right," especially to a question containing a negative element. 
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Thereafter, officers "requested minimal personal data from Dougall-name, social security 
number, birth date, birth place, height, weight, and address." Id. at 934. They also 
requested "a hair sample, informing Dougall that they would obtain a court order if he failed 
to comply voluntarily." Id. Dougall began to talk about the charges, then again requested 
an attorney. The officers sat silently with him in the room for a short time, and Dougall 
confessed. 
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ruled for the government. Citing Innis. 
the court stated that w[n]one of the actions of which Dougall now complains amounts to 
improper interrogation." Id. at 936. Hence, admission of the hair samples and confession 
were held proper. See also United States v. Moreno-Flores. 33 F.3d 1164, 1169-70 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (after suspect invoked his right to silence, agents told him that they had seized 
600 pounds of cocaine and that he was in trouble and asked suspect where he was the night 
after the drug bust; held, no Miranda violation). 
Like the innocuous questions in Dougall. Detective Cowley's question, "You don't 
want to talk to us?" was not reasonably likely to, and did not, elicit an incriminating 
response. It was therefore not interrogation for Miranda purposes. 
Admittedly, Detective Cowley's later statement, "So I want the truth and I want it 
now" (Def. Ex. 1 at 2, addendum B) was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response. It therefore constituted interrogation. However, it followed defendant's waiver: 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones you 
want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
19 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 1-2). Hence, Detective Cowley's interrogation was not illegal. And of 
course, defendant abruptly invoked his rights only seconds later, Detective Cowley just as 
abruptly and without discussion concluded the interview. 
B. The police had no duty to provide counsel to defendant. 
Defendant complains that police did not call his mother to obtain him an attorney. 
Br. of Appellant at 17. Again, defendant does not contend that by not calling his mother to 
obtain an attorney constituted actual compulsion. Consequently, this omission, even if a 
violation of Miranda, cannot taint defendant's later confession. See Oregon v. Elstad. supra. 
It is therefore irrelevant to this case. However, even viewed in isolation, defendant's 
argument fails because defendant cannot establish that the police had any legal duty to assist 
defendant in obtaining counsel. 
Defendant had no Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his arrest. "The Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel attaches only at the initiation of adversary criminal proceedings, 
see United States v. Gouveia. 467 U.S. 180, 188 (1984), and before proceedings are initiated 
a suspect in a criminal investigation has no constitutional right to the assistance of counsel." 
Davis. 114 S. Ct. at 2354. Accord State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 86 (Utah 1993). Since 
adversary judicial criminal proceedings had not been initiated at the time of defendant's 
interviews, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not yet attached. Thus, to the extent 
defendant may claim that the Cowley interview violated his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel, see Br. of Appellant at 18, his claim is without merit. 
Defendant implies that the Fifth Amendment requires police to provide counsel or 
access to a telephone so that he could obtain counsel. Yet he cites no controlling authority 
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supporting this suggestion. The only Utah, United States, or even Tenth Circuit case he cites 
is State v. Moore. 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985), which is not a Sixth Amendment right-to-
counsel case. 
The foreign precedents he cites are weak. For example, People v. Locke. 200 Cal. 
Rptr. 20 (Cal. App. 1984), states that a warned suspect must be given an opportunity to 
telephone an attorney. However, this conclusion rests on a California statute providing that 
"an arrested person has the right to make at least three completed telephone calls . . ."Cal. 
Penal Code § 851.5, cited in Locke. 200 Cal. Rptr. at 22.10 
United States v. Guido. 704 F.2d 675 (2d Cir. 1983), also relied upon by defendant, 
merely opines that "the better procedure would have been to permit Guido to call his attorney 
on Guido's arrival at the . . . courthouse . . . " Id. at 678. Guido involved a suspect who, 
after his Miranda warning, requested an opportunity to call his attorney. After being told by 
police that "he should consider cooperating with the authorities in their investigation, and that 
he should discuss the possibility of cooperation with his attorney" Guido asked about details 
of the crime, which the police explained. He then confessed. The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals affirmed the trial court's finding that Guido's rights had not been violated. This 
case supports the State's position. 
In Commonwealth v. Zook. 553 A.2d 920 (Pa.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989), 
also cited by defendant, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania split 4-3 on the question of 
whether the suspect's asking "if he could use the phone to call his mother to see if she could 
10
 This was one of two "cites omitted" from defendant's brief. Cf. Br. of Appellant at 19. 
The other is a case applying the statute. See In re Newbern. 360 P.2d 43, 46 (Cal. App. 1961). 
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get him an attorney" was an equivocal or unequivocal invocation of his right not to be 
interrogated without counsel present. Four justices believed that Zook "clearly invoked his 
rights under Miranda"; three justices believed the statement was "equivocal." Id. at 922-23; 
923 (Larsen, J., dissenting). Whether police were required to provide a telephone was not at 
issue in the case. 
That Detective Cowley did not fetch defendant a phone is irrelevant. He had no duty 
to do so. 
C. The police did not threaten defendant. 
Defendant claims that he was threatened by Detective Cowley in the first interview. 
This claim is relevant, because a threat is a tactic, like actual coercion, "calculated to 
undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Elstad. 470 U.S. at 309. Here is 
the passage upon which defendant bases his claim to have been threatened: 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will answer the ones 
you want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well. I'll tell vou right now that if vou take that attitude with us. 
DS: Well I ain't trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who has done 
what and who has done what to who. So I want the truth out of vou and 
I want it now. Now do vou understand that? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Who were you with tonightf?] 
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(Def. Ex. 1 at 2, addendum B, emphasis added). Although defendant now complains that 
Detective Cowley's comments threatened "some unspecified dire consequences," Br. of 
Appellant at 21, defendant in fact easily and without consequences shrugged off these 
purported threats and invoked his rights almost immediately: 
TC: Who were you with tonight[?] 
DS: J.D. 
TC: Who else? 
DS: Some of my friends, I want mv lawyer here, all vou have to do is call my 
mom and he will be down here. 
TC: You want your attorney? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And vou don't want to talk to us? 
DS: Yes 
TC: O.K. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 2). 
Detective Cowley admonished defendant to tell the truth and implied that the police 
already had the whole truth. Even "telling the accused that it would be better for him to 
speak or tell the truth does not furnish any inducement, or a sufficient inducement, to render 
objectionable a confession thereby obtained, unless threats or promises are applied." State v. 
Griffin. 754 P.2d 965, 970 (Utah App. 1988) (quoting State v. Ashdown. 5 Utah 2d 59, 296 
P.2d 726 (1956)). 
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Also, the mere fact that police may make threatening remarks does not establish that a 
confession is involuntary. Although the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century held that 
"any threat or promise, however slight, renders a confession involuntary and inadmissible, 
later cases do not repeat that rigid rule but follow the totality of all the circumstances test." 
State v. Strain. 779 P.2d 221, 227 (Utah 1989). 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988), is illustrative. There, an interrogating 
officer said in defendant's presence, T m going to punch his lights out." Id. at 462. He 
also implied that Bishop was going to prison, where the other prisoners "would not react 
well" when they learned he liked to "sleep with little boys." Id. The Utah Supreme Court 
held that "[although some of [the officer's] remarks during the initial interview may be 
characterized as 'threatening' in nature, when viewed in the totality of surrounding 
circumstances, the police interrogation does not reveal utilization of those impermissible 
methods proscribed by the fourteenth amendment." Id. 
The salient fact in the case at bar is that defendant did not confess after the alleged 
threats, but peremptorily terminated the interview. Only later, after being reminded of his 
rights and that he had previously exercised them, did he confess. 
D. Police conduct did not "taint" defendant's confession. 
Defendant has failed to establish any actual coercion in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment, as opposed to the prophylactic Miranda rules. Moreover, he has failed to 
acknowledge his burden to establish a causal link between the alleged coercion and 
defendant's subsequent confession. Therefore, the attenuation analysis does not apply here. 
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However, even under attenuation analysis, defendant's claim fails. The relevant 
factors are (1) whether Miranda warnings were given, (2) the temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the confession, (3) the absence or presence of intervening circumstances, and 
(4) the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Allen. 839 P.2d at 300-01. 
The factors here favor attenuation. (1) Defendant received Miranda warnings at the 
beginning of the first interview and was reminded of them at the beginning of the second. 
He also invoked his Miranda rights at least once, to end the first interview. (2) There was a 
one- to two-hour hiatus between interviews. (3) One intervening circumstance is decisive: 
after the alleged police illegality, defendant invoked his rights and Detective Cowley ceased 
all interrogation and conversation immediately. (4) The purposes of the alleged police 
illegality were to clarify defendant's response and to encourage him to tell the truth. The 
police conduct cannot by any stretch of the imagination be termed flagrant. 
In sum, because defendant cannot establish actual coercion, this case does not qualify 
for attenuation analysis. But even if it did, that analysis requires admitting the confession. 
POINT H 
IN THE SECOND INTERVIEW, DEFENDANT'S WAIVER OF RIGHTS WAS 
KNOWING AND INTELLIGENT, AND HIS CONFESSION VOLUNTARY 
A. Full re-recitation of the Miranda warnings was unnecessary. 
Defendant claims that his confession in the second interview was unwarned because 
Detective Cowley did not repeat in full the Miranda warnings he had administered one to two 
hours earlier in the first interview. Here is what was said in that second interview: 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights? 
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DS: Yes. 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you said that you wanted to talk to 
a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Now is it your desire and you come forth voluntarily that you want to talk 
to me now? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Go ahead. 
(Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B). 
Defendant did not need to be re-Mirandized, because his initial Miranda warning 
remained effective. Miranda warnings are not accorded "unlimited efficacy or perpetuity." 
United States v. Hopkins. 433 F.2d 1041, 1045 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, denied, 401 U.S. 
1013, 91 S. Ct. 1252 (1971). Nevertheless, a warning once given may have continuing 
effect past the interview in which it was given, so that statements made in later interrogations 
will be considered warned. See, e.g., Martin v. Wainwrieht. 770 F.2d 918, 930 (11th Cir. 
1985) (seven days), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 909 (1986); Maeuire v. United States. 396 F.2d 
327, 331 (9th Cir. 1968) (three days), cert, denied, 393 U.S. 1099 (1969); Whitmore v. 
Lockhart. 834 F. Supp. 1105, 1124 (E.D. Ark. 1992) (two days), aff'd, 8 F.3d 614 (8th Cir. 
1993) (no discussion of Miranda issue): United States v. Smith. 679 F. Supp. 410, 411 (D. 
Del. 1988) (two and a half hours); State v. Henrv. 863 P.2d 861, 869 (Ariz. 1993) (six 
hours); People v. Mickle. 814 P.2d 290, 305 (Cal. 1991) (en banc) (thirty-six hours), cert. 
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denied, 112 S.Ct. 1679 (1992); State v. Kimble. 546 So. 2d 834, 840 (La. App. 1989) (two 
days); State v. Butzin. 404 N.W.2d 819, 826 (Minn. App. 1987) (nineteen hours); State v. 
Fisher. 350 S.E.2d 334, 341 (N.C. 1986) ("very brief"); Babcock v. State. 473 S.W.2d 941, 
943 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (two days). 
The need for a second warning is governed by the totality of circumstances test. 
Commonwealth v. Ferguson. 282 A.2d 378, 379 (Pa. 1971). Relevant factors include "the 
amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the 
interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, 
the suspect's sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he 
subjectively understands and waives his rights. People v. Mickle. 814 P.2d 290, 305 (Cal. 
1991) (en banc), cert, denied, 112 S. Ct. 1679 (1992). 
Where the record is clear that defendant "subjectively understands and waives his 
rights," that fact should conclude the inquiry. Indeed, this appears to be the rule in Utah. 
State v. Hilfiker. 868 P.2d 826, 831 (Utah App. 1994) (subsequent confession was knowing 
and intelligent where police told defendant he was "still under Miranda"). Here, Detective 
Cowley scrupulously obtained defendant's waivers. He specifically reminded defendant that 
he had been advised of his rights and that he had in fact invoked his rights to remain silent 
and not to be interrogated without counsel present. Detective Cowley was also careful to 
ensure that defendant both wanted to talk and wanted to talk without a lawyer. He also 
confirmed that these waivers were defendant's "desire" and that he was coming forth 
"voluntarily" to talk (Def. Ex. 1 at 3, addendum B). That should conclude the inquiry. 
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Defendant's belief that "[r]e-Mirandizing should be required prior to all subsequent 
interrogations," Br. of Appellant at 30, is inconsequential: this ground was not preserved 
below; his proposed rule is followed, apparently, only in Hawaii; the rule is not required by 
the Court that created Miranda; and, as demonstrated by the facts of this case, the rule is 
poor policy. 
B. Defendant demonstrated his understanding of his Miranda rights by 
terminating the first interview by invoking them. 
If anything in this case is clear, it is this: defendant understood his Miranda rights. 
They were explained to him in the first interview. He later brusquely ended the interview by 
invoking these rights. Once defendant made clear that he did not want to talk, the police 
stopped the interrogation without discussion. In the second interview, defendant was 
reminded of his rights and, further, reminded that he had curtailed the first interview by 
invoking them. Then he was asked separately about his desire to waive his right to remain 
silent and his right to have counsel present. He waived both categorically. 
Defendant's claim on appeal that his "will was overborne" contradicts the facts. 
C. Defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to 
counsel. 
Defendant claims that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his 
right to counsel. Br. of Appellant at 33. 
"Statements made by a person after invoking the right to counsel are admissible if (1) 
the accused, not the law enforcement officers, initiates the conversations in which the 
incriminating statements are made; (2) the prosecution shows a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of accused's right to counsel; and (3) the prosecution shows by a preponderance of 
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evidence that the statements were voluntarily made." State v. Hilfiker. 868 P.2d 826, 830 
(Utah App. 1994) (citing State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1985)). All three factors 
are met here. 
Initiation, it is undisputed that defendant initiated the conversation in which the 
incriminating statements were made. 
Knowing and intelligent waiver. The trial court found that M[t]he defendant made a 
knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel." It went on to find that "it is evident 
that defendant understood that he had a right to counsel and that he elected to proceed 
without benefit of counsel. . . . There was no evidence presented that would indicate that 
defendant did not make an intelligent and voluntary decision to proceed with the 
interrogation" (R. 115, addendum C). Defendant does not acknowledge this finding on 
appeal. As demonstrated above, it is clearly correct. 
Again, the case at bar resembles Hilfiker. Hilfiker terminated an initial interview by 
invoking his right to counsel. He later initiated discussion about the crime. Speaking of this 
second discussion, this Court wrote that Hilfiker "was informed of his Miranda rights . . . 
[The officer] stated, 'I want to make it clear here . . . that you're still under Miranda, you 
have requested an attorney, . . . if you wish to make a statement, we'll listen to it. . . . I 
want you to understand that you still have that right to an attorney." Hilfiker. 868 P.2d at 
831. Hilfiker "acknowledged his rights and still proceeded to make the incriminating 
statements." Id. The court found his waiver to be knowing and intelligent. 
Statements voluntary. "[T]he inquiry into voluntariness is never mechanical, but 
must duly consider both the characteristics of the accused and the details of the 
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interrogation." Allen. 839 P.2d at 300. "In order for a confession to be admissible, it must 
be made freely and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats or violence or obtained by 
improper influence or promises." State v. Watts. 639 P.2d 158, 160 (Utah 1981). "The 
ultimate inquiry is . . . whether physical or psychological force or other improper threats or 
promises prompted the accused to talk when he otherwise would not have done so." Allen. 
839 P.2d at 300. "The fact that a suspect chooses to speak after being informed of his rights 
is, of course, highly probative." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318. 
The district court's finding that defendant waived his rights voluntarily is clearly 
correct. The police employed no violence, no trickery, no psychological pressure, and no 
"improper threats or promises." Defendant's confession was entirely legal and admissible. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED: WRITTEN OPINION NOT REQUESTED 
Because the State anticipates a reply brief in this case, oral argument is requested. If 
no reply brief is filed, the State does not request oral argument. Since the resolution of this 
case involves no novel legal question, a written opinion is unnecessary. 
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IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
A) DAVID STREETER 9/14/72, 
B) DUSTIN WARD 7/6/72, 










Criminal No. 901-10868 
10869 
10870 
The undersigned £>Ae3l8£/ f. /R /JUJ£ under oath states 
on information and belief that the defendant(s) committed the crimes 
of: 
COUNT I 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 6000 West 4100 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
DAVID STREETER and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as parties to the 
offense, intentionally or knowingly attempted to cause 
the death of Craig Mortenson, and/or intending to cause 
serious bodily injury to another, committed an act 
clearly dangerous to human life, and thereby attempted 
to cause the death of Craig Mortenson, and/or acting 
under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to 
human life, engaged in conduct which created a grave 
risk of death to another, and thereby attempted to cause 
the death of Craig Mortenson; 
(Continued on page 2) 0000ii 
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C) KEVIN HARRY NEFF, 90 1 81540 
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COUNT II 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, a Third Degree Felony, at 6000 West 4100 South, 
in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about 
September 22, 1990, in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in 
that the defendants, DAVID STREETER and KEVIN HARRY 
NEFF, as parties to the offense, assaulted Karen 
Mortenson, by attempting to do bodily injury, and/or by 
threatening to do bodily injury to Karen Mortenson with 
unlawful force or violence, by the use of a dangerous 
weapon, to-wit: Rock: 
COUNT III 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 7204 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
DAVID STREETER, DUSTIN WARD and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as 
parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly 
attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long, and/or 
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, and 
thereby attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long, 
and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby 
attempted to cause the death of Mark K. Long; 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT: further, that the offense was 
committed in concert with two or more persons in the 
commission or furtherance of the offenses, giving rise 
to enhanced penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended; 
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COUNT IV 
ATTEMPTED CRIMINAL HOMICIDE, MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE, a Second 
Degree Felony, at 7204 West 3500 South, in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, on or about September 22, 1990, 
in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 203, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the defendants, 
DAVID STREETER, DUSTIN WARD and KEVIN HARRY NEFF, as 
parties to the offense, intentionally or knowingly 
attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson, and/or 
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, 
committed an act clearly dangerous to human life, and 
thereby attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson, 
and/or acting under circumstances evidencing depraved 
indifference to human life, engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another, and thereby 
attempted to cause the death of Ronald Olson, and/or 
while in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediate flight from the commission or attempted 
commission of: Criminal Homicide, attempted to cause 
the death of Ronald Olson; 
SENTENCING ENHANCEMENT: That a firearm or a facsimile 
of a firearm or the representation of a firearm was used 
in the commission or furtherance of the Attempted 
Homicide, giving rise to enhanced penalties as provided 
by Section 76-3-203, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended; further, that the offense was committed in 
concert with two or more persons in the commission or 
furtherance of the offenses, giving rise to enhanced 
penalties as provided by Section 76-3-203.1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended; 
THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING 
WITNESSES: 
Officers: B. Sterner, T. Cowley, A. Call, D. Jensen, R, Day, A. 
Call, T. Cowley, K. Lindgren, S. Bell, R. Judd and R. 
Edwards. 
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Others: Maryann Mortensen, Paul Knight, Craig Mortensen, Karrie 
Mortensen# Dr. David Wilson, Karen Mortensen, Mark K. Long, 
Roland Olsen, Susan C. Taylor, Charles E. Roberts, Cory 
Losser, Kody Evans, Ronald Shepherd, Dr. David Wilson and 
Dr.J. Charles Rich. 
PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT: 
Your affiants, Detectives with West Valley City Police 
Department, and the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, bases this 
Information on the following: 
1. Conversation with Karen Mortenson in which she stated 
that on September 22, 1990, at approximately 6407 West 4100 South, 
their car was forced to the side of the road and ten or more young 
men, including the three above named suspects, ran to the Mortenson 
car, began kicking and beating on the car and threatening to kill the 
four occupants. The driver of the victim's car, Craig Mortenson, 
managed to drive the car away and stopped at a 7-Eleven on 6000 West 
4100 South. As Karen Mortenson spoke to the 911 dispatcher Streeter 
and Neff approached the Mortenson's car carrying rocks and 
threatening again to kill the occupants. Craig Mortenson grabbed a 
hammer from a tool box, stepped outside the car and stated, Ml have 
the right to defend myself." Streeter and Neff attacked Craig 
Mortenson, beating on his head with a rock and kicking his face and 
head. While Karen Mortenson pulled one of the assailants away from 
Craig Mortenson the other ran at her with a rock. He was prevented 
from striking Karen Mortenson only by the intervention of one of the 
Mortenson's teen-age daughters. Craig Mortenson was rushed by Life 
Flight to the University Medical Center for emergency surgery for 
compound depressed skull fracture, which was required to save his 
life. 
2. Conversation with Roland Olsen in which he stated that 
on September 22, 1990, in the early morning hours Mark Long and 
Roland Olsen were parked at another 7-Eleven on 7204 West 3500 




A) DAVID STREETER, 
B) DUSTIN WARD, 








South. A verbal altercation developed between Roland Olsen and Mark 
Long in one truck, and Dustin Ward and a group of juveniles in 
another truck. Suddenly there were twelve or more young men in the 
parking lot, including David Streeter, Dustin Ward and Kevin Neff. A 
fight developed, Roland Olsen observed Mark Long lying on the ground 
and saw David Streeter, Dustin Ward and Kevin Neff repeatedly jumping 
on and kicking Mark Long in the face and head. Ward, Streeter and 
Neff along with the others left the area. Roland Olsen found Mark 
Long was unconscious. He followed Ward, Streeter and Neff and the 
others and confronted them about Long's Condition. David Streeter 
pulled a 22 semi-automatic pistol and threatened to blow Olsen's head 
off. Olsen turned and retreated while others chanted "shoot him, 
shoot him,M Dustin Ward was throwing rocks at Olsen. When Olsen was 
approximately twenty feet away from the group he heard the gun fire. 
A projectile landed near his £eet. As he turned back around he was 
struck in the face by a tire jron. Then Kevin Neff struck him with a 
metal pipe. Mr* Olsen went back to the 7-Eleven. Mark Long required 
emergency surgery on his fractured skull to save his life. 
Judge 
Authorized for presentment and 
f i l i n g : 
DAVID E. YOCOM, Counfey Attorney 
/&a< 
December^?, IS 




O.K. I'm Detective Cowley vith the police department and 




Spell you last name for me. 
Streeter 
What is your date of birth? 
09-14-72 
And you address? 
3551 South 7200 West 
Your home phone number? 
250-9546 
Have you been advised of your rights? 
Yes 
I'm going to.do it again. You have the right to remain 
silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you 
in a court of lav. You have the right to talk to a lavyer 
and have him present vith you while you are being 
questioned. If you cannot afford a hire a lavyer, one vill 
be appointed to represent you before any questioning if you 
vish. You can decide at anytime to exercise these rights 
and not ansver any questions or make any statements. Do you 
understand these rights that I have explained to you? 
Yes 
Having these rights in mind do you vish to speak vith us nov 
vithout an attorney present? 
No 
You don't vant to talk to us? 
I don't knov vhy I am really even in here. All I was doing 
vas sleeping over at my friends lavn last night and the cops 
just come ripping in the yard and arrested us and 
Well ve have a bunch of questions ve would like to ask you, 
vould you be villing to ansver those questions vithout a 
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lawyer present. 
DS: Maybe some of them. It just depends cause I really don't 
know why I am here. 
TC: So does that mean we can ask you questions and you will 
answer the ones you want to answer? 
DS: Yes I have the right to stop at any time though. 
TC: Well, I111 tell you right now that if you take that attitude 
with us. 
DS: Well I ainft trying to 
TC: Because we have all the witnesses we need and we know who 
has done what and who has done what to who. So I want the 
truth out of you and I want it now. Now do you understand 
that? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Who were you with tonight 
DS: J.D. 
TC: Who else? 
DS: Some of my friends, I want my lawyer here, all you have to 
do is call my mom and he vill be down here. 
TC: You vant your attorney? 
DS: Yes 




Interview with David Streeter 
TC: > Do you recall earlier that I had advised you of your rights? 
DS: <-Yes 
TC: ^  And after being advised of your rights you said that you 
wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: ^ Yes 
TC: ;TNOW is it your desire and you come forth voluntarily that 
you want to talk to me now? 
DS: / Yes 
TC: fAnd you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: t Yes 
TC: .- Go ahead, 
DS: ;Just tell the story. 
TC: ' Tell the story. 
DS:'cO-K. we was just coming home from that party... 
TC: Now hold on, you say "we" who is wven. 
DS: It was m^anj^Bart^in^the^car-.xa^Inr-his^car«._^ 
TC: Now does Bart go by Kevin. 
DS: Yes 
TC: And whofs car is that? 
DS: Bart's car, and some guy, he had his brights on, Bart did. 
and that guy in front of us* 
TC: Which direction were you going? 
DS: West 
TC: So you were going West on? 
DS: On 41, so then-he-pulled over-and. let us go ahead of him and. 
then he pulled-behind us and-turned his brights on. 
So we pulled over and let him go in front of us and we 
pulled down the street-and then*he-started to get out*of his-
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car and so ve jumped out of our car and he got back in his 
and I smacked the window. 
TC: With vhat? 
DS: My hand, and then (inaud) 
TC: You don't xnov vho they vere? 
DS: No 
TC: Did you ever kick the car? 
DS: No, I didn't kick the car. And then he drove away and then 
ve vas going back to my house and ve drove by '41 and ve got 
back from 41 and vent to 72 and he vas at the 7-11 and he 
started saying shit to us so ve pulled over vent back and 
valked up to him. 
TC: So after the occurrence of hitting the car and kicking the 
car, then he left. Then you left right after him? 
DS: No, about 5 minutes. 
TC: So, on your vay to your house you sav. 
DS: Yes, ve got back on 41 and he vas at the 7-11. 
TC: You. sav_the_station. vagon. at..the 7-11? 
DS: Yes,.and they started.yelling shit at us. 
TC: Which 7-11 vere you at? 
DS: The one m 4100 and 6400. 
TC: So you drove by and you sav the car there? 
DS: And he started yelling shit at us and so ve pulled over *nd 
valked up there. 
TC: Where did you pull over at? 
DS: Just on 4100. 
TC: So you didn't pull into the 7-11 parking lot? 
DS: And he had a hammer and he. said "Nov I can kick your guys 
ass", something to that effect. So he vas coming at us atnd 
so I picked a rock.up. and threw it at him. 
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TC: How big was the rock? 
DS: Just a little bigger than a golf ball. 
BS: Biggea^that:.ai.golf_bal.lLajid.. smaller^ than: a. soft, ball? 
DS: Yes; a lot smaller than a soft ball, smaller than a 
baseball. 
TC: So you picked up a rock, where did you get the rock from? 
DS: Just on the ground, I just reached down and grabbed it. 
TC: And then you threw it and hit him in the head. 
DS: I guess it :~'hit* him iri'-th'e—head, I donft know. All*il was 
really going to:do- was" scare_him,;^try
-
^^to_get.him_to1-back_up 
vi t h -1 he ha mme r '.~* 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: iL_guess^_he_hit.,Bart-with-that hammer» 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then.the.girl-jumped on_me. 
TC: What did they do? 
DS: Wrestled me. to. the..ground,-* and. then_I__got_ upland.L~got^thaJ: 
guy_of f. Bart and ..I .said_*let„,s get-out of.here". 
TC: Did you do anything else to that guy besides throw a rock at 
him and hit him. 
DS : I*.might" have kicked^ himr 
TC: Where? 
DS: /In- the- chest*' (inaud) 
TC: Was he laying on the ground when you did that? 
TC: Did you do anything else. 
DS: No 
TC: You didnft hit him in the head and chest and you didnft grab 
a rock and hit him in the head with a rock. 
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OS: Oh, (Li.hit hinuvhen. I_threy_tha t.rock_ the « f i r st . i t ime_..* 
TC: But you d idn' t h i t him with a rock after that? 
DS: No 
TC: But you didnft hit him in the head. 
DS: No, (inaud) 
TC: Did you hit him with anything else? 
DS: No 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: We took off and vent back to my house and sat there and 
everybody-was-leaving-and—Dustin.and-Ron_and..Nerd.^ they..was 
leaving-LandJLL.guess~they-vent—to_the_ 7rll^to^ get.gas/ I 
don't know. We vis all getting ready for bed and the next 
thing you know Neri- vas. knocking, at- the. door. 
TC: Who is Nerd? 
DS: NerdJis-Cody.2 
DS: And he says "some guy started a fight down there with 
Dustin". 
TC: Down vhere? 
DS: The 7-11. 
TC: Which one? 
DS: 3500 and 7200. 
TC: Go ahead. 
DS: So*- ve**ram dovrr* there*.... 
TC: Nov you say "ve", vho is "ve"? 
DS: Me-and-J-.D7-and-Nerd-vas-rvith-us.<* 
TC: So Cody. 
DS: And that is ail that vas in the house. 
TC: What about Kevin? 
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DS : 0h"-yes>« Bart* toor 
TC: So you guys vent down to the 7-11 to help Dustin out? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: There were- two-guys,chasing..him. around..the. parking-lot*. 
TC: Chasing Dustin? 
DS: Yes and I don't know where Ron was. Ron wasn't helping him. 
And the^one^r-run. up_to,. Bart>_Dustin- was.n. backing^up and. Barty 
walkedj^up_by_him and-one grabbed Bart., and., threw.. him_aga ins t. 
vthe.... car and-^ Dustiri: camera- from, around .^  the. side.. o£..;_hiiD^ .andV 
punched., him. and. dropped .him.~£ 
TC: With one punch? 
DS: . Yes 
TC: And he fell down on the ground and this was in the parking 
lot of 7-11. 
DS: Yes 
TC: Then what happened? 
DS: Then the., o t h e r s one* had^^Jay-by^the** hair- and so---we-ran—. up, 
there* and- got-him-off^and^we^justrtook^off** 
TC: Who kicked this guy on the ground? 
DS: £ kicked-him-once. 
TC: Where? 
DS: In the * headT* 
TC: Did you see anyone else kick him? 
DS: No 
TC; So after Dustin hit him and this guy fell down on the ground 
you kicked him in the head? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you didn't see anyone else kick him? 
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DS: I was getting out of there, all I did was vent and got that 
guy off Jay and ve^took^^^running^^cj^to^ my-house. 
TC: Who is "ve"? 
DS: *ie- andrJay_and_Bart> Bart vas probably already at my house. 
I just told them to get out of there. 
TC: Who had the gun? 
DS: Jay_ had. a. BB. gurr. 
TC: When did he get that? 
DS: Probably after ve vent back to the house, I didn't even knov 
he had it cause I took off, I vas getting out of there I 
didn't vant nothing to do vith cops. 
TC: So you vent back to your house c id did you guys come back to 
the 7-11 again after J.D. got th* gun? 
DS: No, tthe^ jJeep; earner up:, by my" hous*-7 from the-parking..lot vith af 
crovbar. and_vas-going-to: kill: Dusting 
TC: From vhat parking lot? 
DS: Ream's, so~ve,all ranwover^.there and 
TC: So you ran over to the Ream's parking lot to help Dustin? 
DS: Just to see vhat vas going on because all ve.: could hear:.vas/ 
Dustin-saying-TheJs^got. a. crovbar" or something. 
TC: And that's vhen J.D. had the gun. 
DS: Yes, cause vhen I got over there that is vhen J.D. had the 
gun. 
TC: Who's gun does that belong to? 
DS: It vas tJayJs. 
TC: Where is the gun nov? 
DS: I have no idea. 
TC: You don't knov vhat happened to it? 
DS: No, I vas getting out of there. I didn't vant nothing to do 
vith it. 
Page 9 
Interview with David Streeter 
TC: What did you see J.D. do with the gun/ did you see him point 
it at anybody? 
DS: He just had it in his hand, he didn't point it at anybody. 
TC: Did he point it at anybody, did he shoot at anybody? 
DS: No, it wasn't loaded (inaud) 
TC: Then after the altercation in the parking lot at Ream's what 
happened? 
DS: That guy left and then we left and we went over to Jay's 
house. 
TC: So you didn't go back down by the 7-11 to check on this 
other guy. So you don't know what happened to him? But §CQU:E7 
jcickedrhimconcejrinrthe^head^whiler.heii,wasjLon^ the, ground?.. 
DS: HtFVas^onT-his^way^down^ 
TC: Did you see anybody else kick him or hit him on the ground, 
how about Kevin? 
DS: The only time I saw Bart was when that guy had him up 
against the car and Dustin smacked that guy and he was on 
his was down and_I kicked him and that is the last time I 
seen Kevin, (inaud) 
TC: Going back to the first incident at the 7-11 on 6400 West 
how many times did you hit and kick that guy? 
DS: /I-kicked: him one-.time: and- IT don't., even- thin^I'-hit-him^ 
TC: You. didn't hit. him with-your-fist?.. 
DS: M or~-
TC: So you only hit him once with a rock and that was in the 
head? 
DS: I guess so 
TC: And then you kicked him in the head? 
DS: No 
TC: Where did you kick him? 
DS: Across th_e_sUJ&«^ 
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TC: Across the shoulder, vas he laying on the ground when 
kicked him? 
DS: He was on top of Bart. 
TC: What did you see Bart do to him? 
















What did they do? 
Just vrestled me dovn. -
What did you do to the girls? 
Just pushed them avay and told them to back off. 
You didn't hit them with your fist or kick them? 
No, I_wouldnj t_ hit a girl. _ 
You didn't hit them vith a rock. 
No, that laj3y_came^A|te?_me_yith a nammer.. 
„P;id_ yqu^hit^her^ v.i tji_ a xock:? 
Did,.you„throv. a_rock., at her?^ 
No 
You are sure? 
Ifm positive. 
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CASE NOS. (9ll900"262t 
911900263 
911900264 
The Court heard defendant Streeter's Motion to Suppress 
evidence on the 23rd day of September, 1991. Defendant was 
represented by Brooke C. Wells. Plaintiff was represented by 
Barbara J. Byrne. The Court heard the testimony of witnesses, 
heard oral argument and took the matter under advisement. The 
Court having read the transcript of the preliminary hearing and 
the cases cited is now ready to rule. 
The facts are undisputed that the defendant, while being 
interrogated by Detective Cowley unequivocally requested that 
an attorney be present. At that point in time, Detective 
Cowley terminated the questioning and defendant was returned to 
the holding cell. 
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Later on that night defendant told Detective Edwards that 
he would like to talk to Detective Cowley. Detective Edwards 
arranged for the meeting. 
At the time Detective Cowley and defendant met, the 
following dialogue took place: 
TC: Do you recall earlier that I had advised you 
of your rights? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And after being advised of your rights you 
said that you wanted to talk to a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Now is it your desire and you come forth 
voluntarily that you want to talk to me now? 
DS: Yes 
TC: And you want to talk to me without a lawyer? 
DS: Yes 
TC: Go ahead. 
DS: Just tell the story. 
TC: Tell the story. 
DS: O.K. we was just coming home from that 
party. . . 
The issue presented to the Court was whether or not the 
confession of the defendant should be suppressed inasmuch as 
defendant had unequivocally requested that counsel be present. 
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In State v. Sampson. 156 Utah Adv. Rep, 4, this issue was 
addressed and the Utah Appellate Court ruled that "once right 
to counsel has been invoked11 subsequent incriminating 
statements made without [the defendant's] attorney present 
[violates] the rights secured to the defendant by the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
However, the Court went on to say in a footnote, "The 
Edwards Court, Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), did not 
foreclose the possibility of waiver of right to counsel when a 
defendant, once having invoked the right, freely initiates 
further conversation with officers even though the defendant 
has not consulted counsel." 
The Edwards case also set forth the following criteria for 
the admission of a confession after a request for an attorney 
had been made by the defendant. 
1. The police officer conducting the first interrogation 
ceased interrogation when the defendant requested counsel. In 
this case the police did stop interrogation upon defendant's 
request for counsel. 
2. The defendant, not the police officers, must initiate 
the conversations in which incriminating statements are made. 
The evidence was undisputed that defendant initiated the 
conversations. 
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3. The defendant made a knowing and intelligent waiver of 
his right to counsel. In reading lines 1 through 8 of page 3 
of the transcript of the interrogation it is evident that 
defendant understood that he had a right to counsel and that he 
elected to proceed without benefit of counsel. 
There was no evidence presented that would indicate that 
defendant did not make an intelligent and voluntary decision to 
proceed with the interrogation. 
The Court concludes that the credible evidence requires the 
Court to deny defendant's Motion to Suppress. 
Dated this /** day of October, 1991. 
JOHN A. ROKICH 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, 
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Barbara J. Byrne 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Brooke C. Wells 
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